

Chapter 7

Strategic Leadership

It became clear to me that at the age of 58 I would have to learn new tricks that were not taught in the military manuals or on the battlefield. In this position I am a political soldier and will have to put my training in rapping-out orders and making snap decisions on the back burner, and have to learn the arts of persuasion and guile. I must become an expert in a whole new set of skills.

General of the Army George C. Marshall

7-1. Strategic leaders are the Army's highest-level thinkers, warfighters, and political-military experts. Some work in an institutional setting within the United States; others work in strategic regions around the world. They simultaneously sustain the Army's culture, envision the future, convey that vision to a wide audience, and personally lead change. Strategic leaders look at the environment outside the Army today to understand the context for the institution's future role. They also use their knowledge of the current force to anchor their vision in reality. This chapter outlines strategic leadership for audiences other than the general officers and Senior Executive Service DA civilians who actually lead there. Those who support strategic leaders need to understand the distinct environment in which these leaders work and the special considerations it requires.

7-2. Strategic leadership requires significantly different techniques in both scope and skill from direct and organizational leadership. In an environment of extreme uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity, and volatility, strategic leaders think in multiple time domains and operate flexibly to manage change. Moreover, strategic leaders often interact with other leaders over whom they have minimal authority.

7-3. Strategic leaders are not only experts in their own domain—warfighting and leading large military organizations—but also are astute in the departmental and political environments of the nation's decision-making process. They're expected to deal competently with the public sector, the executive branch, and the legislature. The complex national security

environment requires an in-depth knowledge of the political, economic, informational, and military elements of national power as well as the interrelationship among them. In short, strategic leaders not only know themselves and their own organizations but also understand a host of different players, rules, and conditions.

7-4. Because strategic leaders implement the National Military Strategy, they deal with the elements that shape that strategy. The most important of these are Presidential Decision Memorandums, Department of State Policies, the will of the American people, US national security interests, and the collective strategies—theater and functional—of the combatant commanders (CINCs). Strategic leaders operate in intricate networks of competing

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constituencies and cooperate in endeavors extending beyond their establishments. As institutional leaders, they represent their organizations to soldiers, DA civilians, citizens, statesmen, and the media, as well as to other services and nations. Communicating effectively with these different audiences is vital to the organization's success.

7-5. Strategic leaders are keenly aware of the complexities of the national security environment. Their decisions take into account factors such as congressional hearings, Army budget constraints, reserve component issues, new systems acquisition, DA civilian programs, research, development, and interservice cooperation. Strategic leaders process information from these areas quickly, assess alternatives based on incomplete data, make decisions, and garner support. Often, highly developed interpersonal skills are essential to building consensus among civilian and military policy makers. Limited interpersonal skills can limit the effect of other skills.

7-6. While direct and organizational leaders have a short-term focus, strategic leaders have a "future focus." Strategic leaders spend much of their time looking toward the mid-term and positioning their establishments for long-term success, even as they contend with immediate issues. With that perspective, strategic leaders seldom see the whole life span of their ideas; initiatives at this level may take years to come to fruition. Strategic leaders think, therefore, in terms of strategic systems that will operate over extended time periods. They ensure these systems are built in accord with the six imperatives mentioned in Chapter 6—quality people, training, force mix, doctrine, modern equipment, and leader development—and they ensure that programs and resources are in place to sustain them. This systems approach sharpens strategic leaders' "future focus" and helps align separate actions, reduce conflict, and improve cooperation.

SECTION I

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP SKILLS

7-7. The values and attributes demanded of Army leaders are the same at all leadership levels. Strategic leaders live by Army values and set the example just as much as direct and organizational leaders, but they face additional challenges. Strategic leaders affect the culture of the entire Army and may find themselves involved in political decision making at the highest national or even global levels. Therefore, nearly any task strategic leaders set out to accomplish requires more coordination, takes longer, has a wider impact, and produces longer-term effects than a similar organizational-level task.

7-8. Strategic leaders understand, embody, and execute values-based leadership. The political and long-term nature of their decisions doesn't release strategic leaders from the current demands of training, readiness, and unforeseen crises; they are responsible to continue to work toward the ultimate goals of the force, despite the burden of those events. Army values provide the constant reference for actions in the stressful environment of strategic leaders. Strategic leaders understand, embody, and execute leadership based on Army values.

INTERPERSONAL SKILLS

7-9. Strategic leaders continue to use interpersonal skills developed as direct and organizational leaders, but the scope, responsibilities, and authority of strategic positions require leaders with unusually sophisticated interpersonal skills. Internally, there are more levels of

people to deal with; externally, there are more interactions with outside agencies, with the media, even with foreign governments. Knowing the Army's needs and goals, strategic leaders patiently but tenaciously labor to convince the proper people about what the Army must have

and become. Figure 7-1 lists strategic leader interpersonal skills.




Figure 7-1. Strategic Leader Skills—Interpersonal

7-10. Strategic leaders and their staffs develop networks of knowledgeable individuals in organizations and agencies that influence their own organizations. Through penetrating assessments, these leaders seek to understand the personal strengths and weaknesses of all the main players on a particular issue. Strategic leaders are adept at reading other people, and they work to completely control their own actions and reactions. Armed with improved knowledge of others, self-control, and established networks, strategic leaders influence external events by providing leadership, timely and relevant information, and access to the right people and agencies.

COMMUNICATING

7-11. Communication at the strategic level is complicated by the wide array of staff, functional, and operational components interacting with each other and with external agencies. These complex relationships require strategic leaders to employ comprehensive

communications skills as they represent their organizations. One of the most prominent differences between strategic leaders and leaders at other levels is the greater importance of symbolic communication. The example strategic leaders set, their decisions, and their actions have meaning beyond their immediate consequences to a much greater extent than those of direct and organizational leaders.

7-12. Thus, strategic leaders identify those actions that send messages. Then they use their positions to send the desired messages to their organizations and ensure that the right audiences hear them. The messages strategic leaders send set the example in the largest sense. For instance, messages that support traditions, Army values, or a particular program indicate the strategic leader's priorities.

7-13. Thus, strategic leaders communicate not only to the organization but also to a large external audience that includes the political leadership, media, and the American people. To influence those audiences, strategic leaders seek to convey integrity and win trust. As GA Marshall noted, they become expert in "the art of persuasion."

7-14. Strategic leaders commit to a few common, powerful, and consistent messages and repeat them over and over in different forms and settings. They devise a communications campaign plan, written or conceptual, that outlines how to deal with each target group. When preparing to address a specific audience, they determine its composition and agenda so they know how best to reach its members. Finding some apparent success with the medium, frequency, and words of the message, strategic leaders determine the best way to measure the message's effectiveness and continually scan and assess the environment to make sure that the message is going to all the right groups.

USING DIALOGUE

7-15. One of the forms of communication that strategic leaders use to persuade individuals, rather than groups, is dialogue. Dialogue is a conversation between two or more people. It requires not only active listening, but carefully considering what's said (and not said), logically

assessing it without personal bias, and specifying issues that are not understood or don't make sense within the strategic leader's frame of reference. By using dialogue to thoroughly exchange points of view, assumptions, and concepts, strategic leaders gather information, clarify issues, and enlist support of subordinates and peers.

NEGOTIATING

7-16. Many relationships between strategic-level organizations are lateral and without clear subordination. Often, strategic leaders rely heavily on negotiating skills to obtain the cooperation and support necessary to accomplish a mission or meet the command's needs. For example, commanders of the national contingents that made up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) implementation force (IFOR) sent to Bosnia to support the 1995 Dayton peace accords all had limitations imposed on the extent of their participation. In addition, they all had direct lines to their home governments, which they used when they believed IFOR commanders exceeded those limits. NATO strategic leaders had to negotiate some actions that ordinarily would have required only issuing orders. They often had to interpret a requirement to the satisfaction of one or more foreign governments.

7-17. Successful negotiation requires a range of interpersonal skills. Good negotiators are also able to visualize several possible end states while maintaining a clear idea of the best end state from the command's perspective. One of the most important skills is the ability to stand firm on nonnegotiable points while simultaneously communicating respect for other participants and their negotiating limits. In international forums, firmness and respect demonstrate that the negotiator knows and understands US interests. That understanding can help the negotiator persuade others of the validity of US interests and convince others that the United States understands and respects the interests of other states.

7-18. A good negotiator is particularly skilled in active listening. Other essential personal characteristics include perceptiveness and objectivity. Negotiators must be able to diagnose

unspoken agendas and detach themselves from the negotiation process. Successful negotiating involves communicating a clear position on all issues while still conveying willingness to bargain on negotiable issues, recognizing what's acceptable to all concerned, and achieving a compromise that meets the needs of all participants to the greatest extent possible.

7-19. Sometimes strategic leaders to put out a proposal early so the interchange and ultimate solution revolve around factors important to the Army. However, they are confident enough to resist the impulse to leave their thumbprints on final products. Strategic leaders don't have to claim every good idea because they know they will have more. Their understanding of selfless service allows them to subordinate personal recognition to negotiated settlements that produce the greatest good for their establishment, the Army, and the nation or coalition.

ACHIEVING CONSENSUS

7-20. Strategic leaders are skilled at reaching consensus and building and sustaining coalitions. They may apply these skills to tasks as diverse as designing combatant commands, JTFs, and policy working groups or determining the direction of a major command or the Army as an institution. Strategic leaders routinely weld people together for missions lasting from months to years. Using peer leadership rather than strict positional authority, strategic leaders oversee progress toward their visualized end state and monitor the health of the relationships necessary to achieve it. Interpersonal contact sets the tone for professional relations: strategic leaders are tactful and discreet.

7-21. GA Eisenhower's creation of SHAEF during World War II (which was mentioned in Chapter 2) is an outstanding example of coalition building and sustainment. GA Eisenhower insisted on unity of command over the forces assigned to him. He received this authority from both the British and US governments but exercised it through an integrated command and staff structure that related influence roughly to the contribution of the nations involved. The sections within SHAEF all had

chiefs of one nationality and deputies of another.

7-22. GA Eisenhower also insisted that military, rather than political, criteria would predominate in his operational and strategic decisions as Supreme Allied Commander. His most controversial decisions, adoption of the

so-called broad-front strategy and the refusal to race the Soviet forces to Berlin, rested on his belief that maintaining the Anglo-American alliance was a national interest and his personal responsibility. Many historians argue that this feat of getting the Allies to work together was his most important contribution to the war.

Allied Command During the Battle of the Bulge

A pivotal moment in the history of the Western Alliance arrived on 16 December 1944, when the German Army launched a massive offensive in a lightly held sector of the American line in the Ardennes Forest. This offensive, which became known as the Battle of the Bulge, split GEN Omar Bradley's Twelfth Army Group. North of the salient, British GEN Bernard Montgomery commanded most of the Allied forces, so GA Eisenhower shifted command of the US forces there to GEN Montgomery rather than have one US command straddle the gap. GEN Bradley, the Supreme Allied Commander reasoned, could not effectively control forces both north and south of the penetration. It made more sense for GEN Montgomery to command all Allied forces on the northern shoulder and GEN Bradley all those on its southern shoulder. GA Eisenhower personally telephoned GEN Bradley to tell his old comrade of the decision. With the SHAEF staff still present, GA Eisenhower passed the order to his reluctant subordinate, listened to GEN Bradley's protests, and then said sharply, "Well, Brad, those are my orders."

According to historian J.D. Morelock, this short conversation, more than any other action taken by GA Eisenhower and the SHAEF staff during the battle, "discredited the German assumption that nationalistic fears and rivalries would inhibit prompt and effective steps to meet the German challenge." It demonstrated GA Eisenhower's "firm grasp of the true nature of an allied command" and it meant that Hitler's gamble to win the war had failed.

7-23. Across the Atlantic Ocean, GA George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, also had to seek consensus with demanding peers, none more so than ADM Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, US Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. GA Marshall expended great personal energy to ensure that interservice feuding at the top didn't mar the US war effort. ADM King, a forceful leader with strong and often differing views, responded in kind. Because of the ability of these two strategic leaders to work in harmony, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had few issues of major consequence to resolve once he had issued a decision and guidance.

7-24. Opportunities for strategic leadership may come at surprising moments. For instance, Joshua Chamberlain's greatest contribution to

our nation may have been not at Gettysburg or Petersburg, but at Appomattox. By that time a major general, Chamberlain was chosen to command the parade at which GEN Lee's Army of Northern Virginia laid down its arms and colors. GEN Grant had directed a simple ceremony that recognized the Union victory without humiliating the Confederates.

7-25. However, MG Chamberlain sensed the need for something even greater. Instead of gloating as the vanquished army passed, he directed his bugler to sound the commands for attention and present arms. His units came to attention and rendered a salute, following his order out of respect for their commander, certainly not out of sudden warmth for recent enemies. That act set the tone for reconciliation

and reconstruction and marks a brilliant leader, brave in battle and respectful in peace, who knew when, where, and how to lead.

BUILDING STAFFS

The best executive is the one who has sense enough to pick good men to do what he wants done, and self-restraint enough to keep from meddling with them while they do it.

Theodore Roosevelt
26th President of the United States

7-26. Until Army leaders reach the highest levels, they cannot staff positions and projects as they prefer. Strategic leaders have not only the authority but also the responsibility to pick the best people for their staffs. They seek to put the right people in the right places, balancing strengths and weaknesses for the good of the nation. They mold staffs able to package concise, unbiased information and build networks across organizational lines. Strategic leaders make so many wide-ranging, interrelated decisions that they must have imaginative staff members who know the environment, foresee consequences of various courses of action, and identify crucial information accordingly.

7-27. With their understanding of the strategic environment and vision for the future, strategic leaders seek to build staffs that compensate for

their weaknesses, reinforce their vision, and ensure institutional success. Strategic leaders can't afford to be surrounded by staffs that blindly agree with everything they say. Not only do they avoid surrounding themselves with "yes-men," they also reward staff members for speaking the truth. Strategic leaders encourage their staffs to participate in dialogue with them, discuss alternative points of view, and explore all facts, assumptions, and implications. Such dialogue assists strategic leaders to fully assess all aspects of an issue and helps clarify their intent and guidance.

7-28. As strategic leaders build and use their staffs, they continually seek honesty and competence. Strategic-level staffs must be able to discern what the "truth" is. During World War II, GA Marshall's ability to fill his staff and commands with excellent officers made a difference in how quickly the Army could create a wartime force able to mobilize, deploy, fight, and win. Today's strategic leaders face an environment more complex than the one GA Marshall faced. They often have less time than GA Marshall had to assess situations, make plans, prepare an appropriate response, and execute. The importance of building courageous, honest, and competent staffs has correspondingly increased.

CONCEPTUAL SKILLS

From an intellectual standpoint, Princeton was a world-shaking experience. It fundamentally changed my approach to life. The basic thrust of the curriculum was to give students an appreciation of how complex and diverse various political systems and issues are....The bottom line was that answers had to be sought in terms of the shifting relationships of groups and individuals, that politics pervades all human activity, a truth not to be condemned but appreciated and put to use.

Admiral William Crowe
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



**Figure 7-2. Strategic Leader Skills—
Conceptual**

7-29. Strategic leaders, more than direct and organizational leaders, draw on their conceptual skills to comprehend national, national security, and theater strategies, operate in the strategic and theater contexts, and improve their vast, complex organizations. The variety and scope of their concerns demand the application of more sophisticated concepts.

7-30. Strategic leaders need wisdom—and wisdom isn’t just knowledge. They routinely deal with diversity, complexity, ambiguity, change, uncertainty, and conflicting policies. They are responsible for developing well-reasoned positions and providing their views and advice to

our nation’s highest leaders. For the good of the Army and the nation, strategic leaders seek to determine what’s important now and what will be important in the future. They develop the necessary wisdom by freeing themselves to stay in touch with the force and spending time thinking, simply thinking.

ENVISIONING

It is in the minds of the commanders that the issue of battle is really decided.

Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart

7-31. Strategic leaders design compelling visions for their organizations and inspire a collaborative effort to articulate the vision in detail. They then communicate that vision clearly and use it to create a plan, gain support, and focus subordinates’ work. Strategic leaders have the further responsibility of defining for their diverse organizations what counts as success in achieving the vision. They monitor their progress by drawing on personal observations, review and analysis, strategic management plans, and informal discussions with soldiers and DA civilians.

7-32. Strategic leaders look realistically at what the future may hold. They consider things they know and things they can anticipate. They incorporate new ideas, new technologies, and new capabilities. The National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy guide strategic leaders as they develop visions for their organizations. From a complicated mixture of ideas, facts, conjecture, and personal experience they create an image of what their organizations need to be.

7-33. Once strategic leaders have developed a vision, they create a plan to reach that end state. They consider objectives, courses of action to take the organization there, and resources needed to do the job. The word “vision” implies that strategic leaders create a conceptual model of what they want. Subordinates will be more involved in moving the organization forward if they can “see” what the leader has in mind. And because moving a large organization is often a long haul, subordinates need some sign that they’re making progress. Strategic leaders therefore provide intermediate objectives that act as milestones for their subordinates in checking their direction and measuring their progress.

7-34. The strategic leader’s vision provides the ultimate sense of purpose, direction, and motivation for everyone in the organization. It is at once the starting point for developing specific goals and plans, a yardstick for measuring what the organization accomplishes, and a check on organizational values. Ordinarily, a strategic leader’s vision for the organization may have a time horizon of years, or even decades. In combat, the horizon is much closer, but strategic leaders still focus far beyond the immediate actions.

7-35. The strategic leader’s vision is a goal, something the organization strives for (even though some goals may always be just out of reach). When members understand the vision, they can see it as clearly as the strategic leader can. When they see it as worthwhile and accept it, the vision creates energy, inspiration, commitment, and a sense of belonging.

7-36. Strategic leaders set the vision for their entire organization. They seek to keep the vision consistent with the external environment, alliance or coalition goals, the National Security Strategy, and the National Military Strategy. Subordinate leaders align their visions and intent with their strategic leader’s vision. A strategic leader’s vision may be expressed in everything from small acts to formal, written policy statements.

7-37. Joint Vision 2010 and Army Vision 2010, which is derived from it, are not based on

formal organizations; rather they array future technologies and force structure against emerging threats. While no one can yet see exactly what that force will look like, the concepts themselves provide an azimuth and a point on the horizon. Achieving well-publicized milestone initiatives shows that the Army as an institution is progressing toward the end state visualized by its strategic leaders.

DEVELOPING FRAMES OF REFERENCE

7-38. All Army leaders build a personal frame of reference from schooling, experience, self-study, and reflection on current events and history. Strategic leaders create a comprehensive frame of reference that encompasses their organization and places it in the strategic environment. To construct a useful frame, strategic leaders are open to new experiences and to comments from others, including subordinates. Strategic leaders are reflective, thoughtful, and unafraid to rethink past experiences and to learn from them. They are comfortable with the abstractions and concepts common in the strategic environment. Moreover, they understand the circumstances surrounding them, their organization, and the nation.

7-39. Much like intelligence analysts, strategic leaders look at events and see patterns that others often miss. These leaders are likely to identify and understand a strategic situation and, more important, infer the outcome of interventions or the absence of interventions. A strategic leader’s frame of reference helps identify the information most relevant to a strategic situation so that the leader can go to the heart of a matter without being distracted. In the new information environment, that talent is more important than ever. Cosmopolitan strategic leaders, those with comprehensive frames of reference and the wisdom that comes from thought and reflection, are well equipped to deal with events having complex causes and to envision creative solutions.

7-40. A well-developed frame of reference also gives strategic leaders a thorough understanding of organizational subsystems and their interacting processes. Cognizant of the relationships

among systems, strategic leaders foresee the possible effects on one system of actions in others. Their vision helps them anticipate and avoid problems.

DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY AND AMBIGUITY

True genius resides in the capacity for evaluation of uncertain, hazardous, and conflicting information.

Sir Winston Churchill
Prime Minister of Great Britain, World War II

7-41. Strategic leaders operate in an environment of increased volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. Change at this level may arrive suddenly and unannounced. As they plan for contingencies, strategic leaders prepare intellectually for a range of uncertain threats and scenarios. Since even great planning and foresight can't predict or influence all future events, strategic leaders work to shape

the future on terms they can control, using diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power.

7-42. Strategic leaders fight complexity by encompassing it. They must be more complex than the situations they face. This means they're able to expand their frame of reference to fit a situation rather than reducing a situation to fit their preconceptions. They don't lose sight of Army values and force capabilities as they focus on national policy. Because of their maturity and wisdom, they tolerate ambiguity, knowing they will never have all the information they want. Instead, they carefully analyze events and decide when to make a decision, realizing that they must innovate and accept some risk. Once they make decisions, strategic leaders then explain them to the Army and the nation, in the process imposing order on the uncertainty and ambiguity of the situation. Strategic leaders not only understand the environment themselves; they also translate their understanding to others.

Strategic Flexibility in Haiti

Operation Uphold Democracy, the 1994 US intervention in Haiti conducted under UN auspices, provides an example of strategic leaders achieving success in spite of extreme uncertainty and ambiguity. Prior to the order to enter Haiti, strategic leaders didn't know either D-day or the available forces. Neither did they know whether the operation would be an invitation (permissive entry), an invasion (forced entry), or something in between. To complicate the actual military execution, former President Jimmy Carter, retired GEN Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn were negotiating with LTG Raoul Cedras, commander in chief of the Haitian armed forces, in the Haitian capital even as paratroopers, ready for a combat jump, were inbound.

When LTG Cedras agreed to hand over power, the mission of the inbound JTF changed from a forced to a permissive entry. The basis for the operation wound up being an operation plan based on an "in-between" course of action inferred by the JTF staff during planning. The ability of the strategic leaders involved to change their focus so dramatically and quickly provides an outstanding example of strategic flexibility during a crisis. The ability of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines of the JTF to execute the new mission on short notice is a credit to them and their leaders at all levels.

7-43. In addition to demonstrating the flexibility required to handle competing demands, strategic leaders understand complex cause-and-effect relationships and anticipate the second- and third-order effects of their decisions throughout the organization. The highly volatile nature of the strategic environment may

tempt them to concentrate on the short term, but strategic leaders don't allow the crisis of the moment absorb them completely. They remain focused on their responsibility to shape an organization or policies that will perform successfully over the next 10 to 20 years. Some second- and third-order effects are desirable; leaders

can design and pursue actions to achieve them. For example, strategic leaders who continually send—through their actions—messages of

trust to subordinates inspire trust in themselves. The third-order effect may be to enhance subordinates' initiative.

TECHNICAL SKILLS

The crucial difference (apart from levels of innate ability) between Washington and the commanders who opposed him was they were sure they knew all the answers, while Washington tried every day and every hour to learn.

James Thomas Flexner
George Washington in the American Revolution



**Figure 7-3. Strategic Leader Skills—
 Technical**

7-44. Strategic leaders create their work on a broad canvas that requires broad technical skills of the sort named in Figure 7-3.

STRATEGIC ART

7-45. The strategic art, broadly defined, is the skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends, ways, and means to promote and defend the national interest. Masters of the strategic art competently integrate the three roles performed by the complete strategist: strategic leader, strategic practitioner, and strategic theorist.

7-46. Using their understanding of the systems within their own organizations, strategic leaders

work through the complexity and uncertainty of the strategic environment and translate abstract concepts into concrete actions. Proficiency in the science of leadership—programs, schedules, and systems, for example—can bring direct or organizational leaders success. For strategic leaders, however, the intangible qualities of leadership draw on their long and varied experience to produce a rare art.

7-47. Strategic leaders do more than imagine and accurately predict the future; they shape it by moving out of the conceptual realm into practical execution. Although strategic leaders never lose touch with soldiers and their technical skills, some practical activities are unique to this level.

7-48. By reconciling political and economic constraints with the Army's needs, strategic leaders navigate to move the force forward using the strategy and budget processes. They spend a great deal of time obtaining and allocating resources and determining conceptual directions, especially those judged critical for future strategic positioning and necessary to prevent readiness shortfalls. They're also charged with overseeing of the Army's responsibilities under Title 10 of the United States Code.

7-49. Strategic leaders focus not so much on internal processes as on how the organization fits into the DOD and the international arena: What are the relationships among external organizations? What are the broad political and social systems in which the organization and the Army must operate? Because of the complex reporting and coordinating relationships, strategic leaders

fully understand their roles, the boundaries of these roles, and the expectations of other departments and agencies. Understanding those interdependencies outside the Army helps strategic leaders do the right thing for the programs, systems, and people within the Army as well as for the nation.

7-50. Theater CINCs, with their service component commanders, seek to shape their environments and accomplish long-term national security policy goals within their theaters. They operate through congressional testimony, creative use of assigned and attached military forces, imaginative bilateral and multilateral programs, treaty obligations, person-to-person contacts with regional leaders, and various joint processes. These actions require strategic leaders to apply the strategic art just as much as does designing and employing force packages to achieve military end states.

7-51. GA Douglas MacArthur, a theater CINC during World War II, became military governor of occupied Japan after the Japanese surrender. His former enemies became his responsibility; he had to deal diplomatically with the defeated nation as well as the directives of American civil authorities and the interests of the former Allies. GA MacArthur understood the difference between preliminary (often called military) end state conditions and the broader set of end state conditions that are necessary for the transition from war to peace. Once a war has ended, military force can no longer be the principal means of achieving strategic aims. Thus, a strategic leader's end state vision must include diplomatic, economic, and informational—as well as military—aspects. GA MacArthur's vision, and the actions he took to achieve it, helped establish the framework that preserved peace in the Pacific Ocean and rebuilt a nation that would become a trusted ally.

7-52. A similar institutional example occurred in the summer of 1990. Then, while the Army was in the midst of the most precisely planned force “build-down” in history, Army Chief of Staff Carl Vuono had to halt the process to meet a crisis in the Persian Gulf. GEN Vuono was required to call up, mobilize and deploy forces necessary to meet the immediate crisis while

retaining adequate capabilities in other theaters. The following year he redeployed Third (US) Army, demobilized the activated reserves, and resumed downsizing toward the smallest active force since the 1930s. GEN Vuono demonstrated the technical skill of the strategic art and proved himself a leader of character and competence motivated by Army values.

LEVERAGING TECHNOLOGY

7-53. Leveraging technology—that is, applying technological capabilities to obtain a decisive military advantage—has given strategic leaders advantages in force projection, in command and control, and in the generation of overwhelming combat power. Leveraging technology has also increased the tempo of operations, the speed of maneuver, the precision of firepower, and the pace at which information is processed. Ideally, information technology, in particular, enhances not only communications, but also situational understanding. With all these advantages, of course, comes increasing complexity: it's harder to control large organizations that are moving quickly. Strategic leaders seek to understand emerging military technologies and apply that understanding to resourcing, allocating, and exploiting the many systems under their control.

7-54. Emerging combat, combat support, and combat service support technologies bring more than changes to doctrine. Technological change allows organizations to do the things they do now better and faster, but it also enables them to do things that were not possible before. So a part of leveraging technology is envisioning the future capability that could be exploited by developing a technology. Another aspect is rethinking the form the organization ought to take in order to exploit new processes that previously were not available. This is why strategic leaders take time to think “out of the box.”

TRANSLATING POLITICAL GOALS INTO MILITARY OBJECTIVES

7-55. Leveraging technology takes more than understanding; it takes money. Strategic leaders call on their understanding and their knowledge of the budgetary process to determine

which combat, combat support, and combat service support technologies will provide the leap-ahead capability commensurate with the cost. Wise Army leaders in the 1970s and 1980s realized that superior night systems and greater standoff ranges could expose fewer Americans to danger yet kill more of the enemy. Those leaders committed money to developing and procuring appropriate weapons systems and equipment. Operation Desert Storm validated these decisions when, for example, M1 tanks destroyed Soviet-style equipment before it could close within its maximum effective range. However strategic leaders are always in the position of balancing budget constraints, technological improvements, and current force readiness

against potential threats as they shape the force for the future.

7-56. Strategic leaders identify military conditions necessary to satisfy political ends desired by America's civilian leadership. They must synchronize the efforts of the Army with those of the other services and government agencies to attain those conditions and achieve the end state envisioned by America's political leaders. To operate on the world stage, often in conjunction with allies, strategic leaders call on their international perspective and relationships with policy makers in other countries.

Show of Force in the Philippines

At the end of November 1989, 1,000 rebels seized two Filipino air bases in an attempt to overthrow the government of the Philippines. There had been rumors that someone was plotting a coup to end Philippine President Corazon Aquino's rule. Now rebel aircraft from the captured airfields had bombed and strafed the presidential palace. President Aquino requested that the United States help suppress the coup attempt by destroying the captured airfields. Vice President Dan Quayle and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger favored US intervention to support the Philippine government. As the principal military advisor to the president, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell was asked to recommend a response to President Aquino's request.

GEN Powell applied critical reasoning to this request for US military power in support of a foreign government. He first asked the purpose of the proposed intervention. The State Department and White House answered that the United States needed to demonstrate support for President Aquino and keep her in power. GEN Powell then asked the purpose of bombing the airfields. To prevent aircraft from supporting the coup, was the reply. Once GEN Powell understood the political goal, he recommended a military response to support it.

The chairman recommended to the White House that American jets fly menacing runs over the captured airfields. The goal would be to prevent takeoffs from the airfields by intimidating the rebel pilots rather than destroying rebel aircraft and facilities. This course of action was approved by President George Bush and achieved the desired political goal: it deterred the rebel pilots from supporting the coup attempt. By understanding the political goal and properly defining the military objective, GEN Powell was able to recommend a course of action that applied a measured military response to what was, from the United States' perspective, a diplomatic problem. By electing to conduct a show of force rather than an attack, the United States avoided unnecessary casualties and damage to the Philippine infrastructure.

7-57. Since the end of the Cold War, the international stage has become more confused. Threats to US national security may come from a number of quarters: regional instability, insurgencies, terrorism, and proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction to name a few. International drug traffickers and other transnational groups are also potential adversaries. To counter such diverse threats, the nation needs a force flexible enough to

execute a wide array of missions, from warfighting to peace operations to humanitarian assistance. And of course, the nation needs strategic leaders with the sound perspective that allows them to understand the

nation's political goals in the complex international environment and to shape military objectives appropriate to the various threats.

SECTION II

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP ACTIONS

Leadership is understanding people and involving them to help you do a job. That takes all of the good characteristics, like integrity, dedication of purpose, selflessness, knowledge, skill, implacability, as well as determination not to accept failure.

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke
Naval Leadership: Voices of Experience

7-58. Operating at the highest levels of the Army, the DOD, and the national security establishment, military and DA civilian strategic leaders face highly complex demands from inside and outside the Army. Constantly changing global conditions challenge their decision-making abilities. Strategic leaders tell the Army story, make long-range decisions, and shape the Army culture to influence the force and its partners inside and outside the United

States. They plan for contingencies across the range of military operations and allocate resources to prepare for them, all the while assessing the threat and the force's readiness. Steadily improving the Army, strategic leaders develop their successors, lead changes in the force, and optimize systems and operations. This section addresses the influencing, operating, and improving actions they use.

INFLUENCING ACTIONS

7-59. Strategic leaders act to influence both their organization and its outside environment. Like direct and organizational leaders, strategic leaders influence through personal example as well as by communicating, making decisions, and motivating.

7-60. Because the external environment is diverse and complex, it's sometimes difficult for strategic leaders to identify and influence the origins of factors affecting the organization. This difficulty applies particularly to fast-paced situations like theater campaigns. Strategic leaders meet this challenge by becoming masters of information, influence, and vision.

7-61. Strategic leaders also seek to control the information environment, consistent with US law and Army values. Action in this area can range from psychological operations campaigns to managing media relationships. Strategic leaders who know what's happening with present and future requirements, both inside and



Figure 7-4. Strategic Leader Actions—Influencing

outside the organization, are in a position to influence events, take advantage of opportunities, and move the organization toward its goals.

7-62. As noted earlier, strategic leaders develop the wisdom and frames of reference necessary to identify the information relevant to the situation at hand. In addition, they use interpersonal skills to develop a network of knowledgeable people, especially in those organizations that can influence their own. They encourage staff members to develop similar networks. Through these networks, strategic leaders actively seek information relevant to their organizations and subject matter experts they can call on to assist themselves and their staffs. Strategic leaders can often call on the nation's best minds and information sources and may face situations where nothing less will do.

COMMUNICATING

Moving our Army into the next century is a journey, not a destination; we know where we are going and we are moving out.

General Gordon R. Sullivan
Former Army Chief of Staff

Communicating a Vision

7-63. The skill of envisioning is vital to the strategic leader. But forming a vision is pointless unless the leader shares it with a broad audience, gains widespread support, and uses it

as a compass to guide the organization. For the vision to provide purpose, direction, and motivation, the strategic leader must personally commit to it, gain commitment from the organization as a whole, and persistently pursue the goals and objectives that will spread the vision throughout the organization and make it a reality.

7-64. Strategic leaders identify trends, opportunities, and threats that could affect the Army's future and move vigorously to mobilize the talent that will help create strategic vision. In 1991 Army Chief of Staff Gordon R. Sullivan formed a study group of two dozen people to help craft his vision for the Army. In this process, GEN Sullivan considered authorship less important than shared vision:

Once a vision has been articulated and the process of buy-in has begun, the vision must be continually interpreted. In some cases, the vision may be immediately understandable at every level. In other cases, it must be translated—put into more appropriate language—for each part of the organization. In still other cases, it may be possible to find symbols that come to represent the vision.

7-65. Strategic leaders are open to ideas from a variety of sources, not just their own organizations. Some ideas will work; some won't. Some will have few, if any, long-lasting effects; others, like the one in this example, will have effects few will foresee.

Combat Power from a Good Idea

In 1941, as the American military was preparing for war, Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers correctly anticipated manpower shortages in industry and in the armed forces as the military grew. To meet this need, she proposed creation of a Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) of 25,000 women to fill administrative jobs and free men for service with combat units. After the United States entered the war, when the size of the effort needed became clearer, Congresswoman Rogers introduced another bill for a WAAC of some 150,000 women. Although the bill met stiff opposition in some quarters, a version passed and eventually the Women's Army Corps was born. Congresswoman Rogers' vision of how to best get the job done in the face of vast demands on manpower contributed a great deal to the war effort.

Telling the Army Story

If you have an important point to make, don't try to be subtle or clever. Use a pile-driver. Hit the point once. Then come back and hit it a second time—a tremendous whack!

Sir Winston Churchill
Prime Minister of Great Britain, World War II

7-66. Whether by nuance or overt presentation, strategic leaders vigorously and constantly represent who Army is, what it's doing, and where it's going. The audience is the Army itself as well as the rest of the world. There's an especially powerful responsibility to explain things to the American people, who support their Army with money and lives. Whether working with other branches of government, federal agencies, the media, other militaries, the other services, or their own organizations, strategic leaders rely increasingly on writing and public speaking (conferences and press briefings) to reinforce the Army's central messages. Because so much of this communication is directed at outside agencies, strategic leaders avoid parochial language and remain sensitive to the Army's image.

7-67. Strategic leaders of all times have determined and reinforced the message that speaks to the soul of the nation and unifies the force. In 1973 Army leaders at all levels knew about "The Big Five," the weapons systems that would transform the Army (a new tank, an infantry fighting vehicle, an advanced attack helicopter, a new utility helicopter, and an air defense system). Those programs yielded the M1 Abrams, the M2/M3 Bradley, the AH-64 Apache, the UH-60 Blackhawk, and the Patriot. But those initiatives were more than sales pitches for newer hardware; they were linked to concepts about how to fight and win against a massive Soviet-style force. As a result, fielding the new equipment gave physical form to the new ideas being adopted at the same time. Soldiers could see improvements as well as read about them. The synergism of new equipment, new ideas, and good leadership resulted in the Army of Excellence.

7-68. Today, given the rapid growth of technology, unpredictable threats, and newly emerging

roles, Army leaders can't cling to new hardware as the key to the Army's vision. Instead, today's strategic leaders emphasize the Army's core strength: Army values and the timeless character of the American soldier. The Army—trained, ready, and led by leaders of character and competence at all levels—has met and will continue to meet the nation's security needs. That's the message of today's Army to the nation it serves.

7-69. A recent example of successfully telling the Army story occurred during Operation Desert Shield. During the deployment phase, strategic leaders decided to get local reporters to the theater of war to report on mobilized reserve component units from their communities. That decision had several effects. The first-order effect was to get the Army story to the citizens of hometown America. That publicity resulted in an unintended second-order effect: a flood of mail that the nation sent to its deployed soldiers. That mail, in turn, produced a third-order effect felt by American soldiers: a new pride in themselves.

STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING

When I am faced with a decision—picking somebody for a post, or choosing a course of action—I dredge up every scrap of knowledge I can. I call in people. I telephone them. I read whatever I can get my hands on. I use my intellect to inform my instinct. I then use my instinct to test all this data. "Hey, instinct, does this sound right? Does it smell right, feel right, fit right?"

General Colin Powell
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

7-70. Strategic leaders have great conceptual resources; they have a collegial network to share thoughts and plan for the institution's continued success and well being. Even when there's consensual decision making, however, everyone knows who the boss is. Decisions made by strategic leaders—whether CINCs deploying forces or service chiefs initiating budget programs—often result in a major commitment of resources. They're expensive and tough to reverse. Therefore, strategic leaders rely on timely feedback throughout the decision-

making process in order to avoid making a decision based on inadequate or faulty information. Their purpose, direction, and motivation flow down; information and recommendations surface from below.

7-71. Strategic leaders use the processes of the DOD, Joint Staff, and Army strategic planning systems to provide purpose and direction to subordinate leaders. These systems include the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPEX), and the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). However, no matter how many systems are involved and no matter how complex they are, providing motivation remains the province of the individual strategic leader.

7-72. Because strategic leaders are constantly involved in this sort of planning and because decisions at this level are so complex and depend on so many variables, there's a temptation to analyze things endlessly. There's always new information; there's always a reason to wait for the next batch of reports or the next dispatch. Strategic leaders' perspective, wisdom, courage, and sense of timing help them know when to decide. In peacetime the products of those decisions may not see completion for 10 to 20 years and may require leaders to constantly adjust them along the way. By contrast, a strategic leader's decision at a critical moment in combat can rapidly alter the course of the war, as did the one in this example.

The D-Day Decision

On 4 June 1944 the largest invasion armada ever assembled was poised to strike the Normandy region of France. Weather delays had already caused a 24-hour postponement and another front of bad weather was heading for the area. If the Allies didn't make the landings on 6 June, they would miss the combination of favorable tides, clear flying weather, and moonlight needed for the assault. In addition to his concerns about the weather, GA Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, worried about his soldiers. Every hour they spent jammed aboard crowded ships, tossed about and seasick, degraded their fighting ability.

The next possible invasion date was 19 June; however the optimal tide and visibility conditions would not recur until mid-July. GA Eisenhower was ever mindful that the longer he delayed, the greater chance German intelligence had to discover the Allied plan. The Germans would use any additional time to improve the already formidable coastal defenses.

On the evening of 4 June GA Eisenhower and his staff received word that there would be a window of clear weather on the next night, the night of 5-6 June. If the meteorologists were wrong, GA Eisenhower would be sending seasick men ashore with no air cover or accurate naval gunfire. GA Eisenhower was concerned for his soldiers.

"Don't forget," GA Eisenhower said in an interview 20 years later, "some hundreds of thousands of men were down here around Portsmouth, and many of them had already been loaded for some time, particularly those who were going to make the initial assault. Those people in the ships and ready to go were in cages, you might say. You couldn't call them anything else. They were fenced in. They were crowded up, and everybody was unhappy."

GA Eisenhower continued, "Goodness knows, those fellows meant a lot to me. But these are the decisions that have to be made when you're in a war. You say to yourself, I'm going to do something that will be to my country's advantage for the least cost. You can't say without any cost. You know you're going to lose some of them, and it's very difficult."

A failed invasion would delay the end of a war that had already dragged on for nearly five years. GA Eisenhower paced back and forth as a storm rattled the windows. There were no guarantees, but the time had come to act.

He stopped pacing and, facing his subordinates, said quietly but clearly, "OK, let's go."

MOTIVATING

It is the morale of armies, as well as of nations, more than anything else, which makes victories and their results decisive.

Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini
Precis de l'Art de Guerre, 1838

Shaping Culture

7-73. Strategic leaders inspire great effort. To mold morale and motivate the entire Army, strategic leaders cultivate a challenging, supportive, and respectful environment for soldiers and DA civilians to operate in. An institution with a history has a mature, well-established culture—a shared set of values and assumptions that members hold about it. At the same time, large and complex institutions like the Army are diverse; they have many subcultures, such as those that exist in the civilian and reserve components, heavy and light forces, and special operations forces. Gender, ethnic, religious, occupational, and regional differences also define groups within the force.

Culture and Values

7-74. The challenge for strategic leaders is to ensure that all these subcultures are part of the larger Army culture and that they all share Army values. Strategic leaders do this by working with the best that each subculture has to offer and ensuring that subcultures don't foster unhealthy competition with each other, outside agencies, or the rest of the Army. Rather, these various subcultures must complement each other and the Army's institutional culture. Strategic leaders appreciate the differences that characterize these subcultures and treat all members of all components with dignity and respect. They're responsible for creating an environment that fosters mutual understanding so that soldiers and DA civilians treat one another as they should.

7-75. Army values form the foundation on which the Army's institutional culture stands. Army values also form the basis for Army policies and procedures. But written values are of little use unless they are practiced. Strategic leaders help subordinates adopt these values by making sure that their experience validates

them. In this, strategic leaders support the efforts all Army leaders make to develop the their subordinates' character. This character development effort (discussed in Appendix E) strives to have all soldiers and DA civilians adopt Army values, incorporate them into a personal code, and act according to them.

7-76. Like organizational and direct leaders, strategic leaders model character by their actions. Only experience can validate Army values: subordinates will hear of Army values, then look to see if they are being lived around them. If they are, the Army's institutional culture is strengthened; if they are not, the Army's institutional culture begins to weaken. Strategic leaders ensure Army values remain fundamental to the Army's institutional culture.

7-77. Over time, an institution's culture becomes so embedded in its members that they may not even notice how it affects their attitudes. The institutional culture becomes second nature and influences the way people think, the way they act in relation to each other and outside agencies, and the way they approach the mission. Institutional culture helps define the boundaries of acceptable behavior, ranging from how to wear the uniform to how to interact with foreign nationals. It helps determine how people approach problems, make judgments, determine right from wrong, and establish priorities. Culture shapes Army customs and traditions through doctrine, policies and regulations, and the philosophy that guides the institution. Professional journals, historical works, ceremonies—even the folklore of the organization—all contain evidence of the Army's institutional culture.

Culture and Leadership

7-78. A healthy culture is a powerful leadership tool strategic leaders use to help them guide their large diverse organizations. Strategic leaders seek to shape the culture to support their vision, accomplish the mission, and improve the organization. A cohesive culture molds the organization's morale, reinforcing an ethical climate built on Army values, especially respect. As leaders initiate changes for long-range improvements, soldiers and DA civilians must feel that they're valued as

persons, not just as workers or program supporters.

7-79. One way the Army’s institutional culture affirms the importance of individuals is through its commitment to leader development: in essence, this commitment declares that people are the Army’s future. By committing to broad-based leader development, the Army has

redefined what it means to be a soldier. In fact, Army leaders have even changed the appearance of American soldiers and the way they perform. Introducing height and weight standards, raising PT standards, emphasizing training and education, and deglamorizing alcohol have all fundamentally changed the Army’s institutional culture.

OPERATING ACTIONS



Figure 7-5. Strategic Leader Actions—Operating

7-80. Operating at the strategic level can involve both short-term and long-term actions. The most agile organizations have standing procedures and policies to take the guesswork out of routine actions and allow leaders to concentrate their imagination and energy on the most difficult tasks. Strategic leaders coordinate their organizations’ actions to accomplish near-term missions, often without the benefit of direct guidance. Strategic leaders receive general guidance—frequently from several sources, including the national command authority.

7-81. Although they perform many of the same operating actions as organizational and direct

leaders, strategic leaders also manage joint, multinational, and interagency relationships. For strategic leaders, planning, preparing, executing, and assessing are nearly continuous, more so than at the other leadership levels, because the larger organizations they lead have continuing missions. In addition, the preparing action takes on a more comprehensive meaning at the strategic leadership level. Leaders at all levels keep one eye on tomorrow. Strategic leaders, to a greater extent than leaders at other levels, must coordinate their organizations’ actions, positioning them to accomplish the current mission in a way that will feed seamlessly into the next one. The Army doesn’t stop at the end of a field exercise—or even after recovering from a major deployment; there’s always another mission about to start and still another one on the drawing board.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

7-82. Strategic-level plans must balance competing demands across the vast structure of the DOD, but the fundamental requirements for strategic-level planning are the same as for direct- and organizational-level planning. At all levels, leaders establish priorities and communicate decisions; however, at the strategic level, the sheer number of players who can influence the organization means that strategic leaders must stay on top of multiple demands. To plan coherently and comprehensively, they look at the mission from other players’ points of view. Strategic planning depends heavily on wisely applying interpersonal and conceptual skills. Strategic leaders ask, What will these people want? How will they see things? Have I justified the mission? The interaction among strategic

leaders' interpersonal and conceptual skills and their operating actions is highly complex.

7-83. Interpersonal and conceptual understanding helped the Army during Operation Uphold Democracy, the US intervention in Haiti. The success of the plan to collect and disarm former Haitian police and military officials, investigate them, remove them (if required), or retrain them owed much to recognizing the special demands of the Haitian psyche. The population needed a secure and stable environment and a way to know when that condition was in place. The Haitians feared the resurgence of government terror, and any long-term solution had to address their concerns. Strategic planners maintained a focus on the desired end state: US disengagement and a return to a peaceful, self-governing Haiti. In the end, the United States forced Haitian leaders to cooperate, restored the elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and made provisions for returning control of affairs to the Haitians themselves.

EXECUTING

There are no victories at bargain prices.

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower

Allocating Resources

7-84. Because lives are precious and materiel is scarce, strategic leaders make tough decisions

about priorities. Their goal is a capable, prepared, and victorious force. In peacetime, strategic leaders decide which programs get funded and consider the implications of those choices. Allocating resources isn't simply a matter of choosing helicopters, tanks, and missiles for the future Army. Strategic resourcing affects how the Army will operate and fight tomorrow. For example, strategic leaders determine how much equipment can be pre-positioned for contingencies without degrading current operational capabilities.

Managing Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Relationships

7-85. Strategic leaders oversee the relationship between their organizations, as part of the nation's total defense force, and the national policy apparatus. They use their knowledge of how things work at the national and international levels to influence opinion and build consensus for the organization's missions, gathering support of diverse players to achieve their vision. Among their duties, strategic leaders—

- Provide military counsel in national policy forums.
- Interpret national policy guidelines and directions.
- Plan for and maintain the military capability required to implement national policy.
- Present the organization's resource requirements.

Multinational Resource Allocation

Following the breakout and pursuit after the Normandy landings, Allied logistics systems became seriously overstretched. GA Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, had to make a number of decisions on resource allocation among his three army groups. These decisions had serious implications for the conduct of the war in the ETO. Both GEN George Patton, Commander of the Third (US) Army in GEN Omar Bradley's Twelfth Army Group, and British GEN Bernard Montgomery, the Twenty-first Army Group Commander, argued that sole priority for their single thrusts into the German homeland could win the war. GA Eisenhower, dedicated to preserving the alliance with an Allied success in the West, gave GEN Montgomery only a limited priority for a risky attempt to gain a Rhine bridgehead, and at the same time, slowed GEN Patton's effort to what was logistically feasible under the circumstances. The Supreme Allied Commander's decision was undoubtedly unpopular with his longtime colleague, GEN Patton, but it contributed to alliance solidarity, sent a message to the Soviets, and ensured a final success that did not rely on the still highly uncertain collapse of German defenses.

- Develop strategies to support national objectives.
- Bridge the gap between political decisions made as part of national strategy and the individuals and organizations that must carry out those decisions.

7-86. As part of this last requirement, strategic leaders clarify national policy for subordinates and explain the perspectives that contribute to that national policy. They develop policies reflecting national security objectives and prepare their organizations to respond to missions across the spectrum of military actions.

7-87. Just as direct and organizational leaders consider their sister units and agencies, strategic leaders consider and work with other armed services and government agencies. How important is this joint perspective? Most of the Army's four-star billets are joint or multinational. Almost half of the lieutenant generals hold similar positions on the Joint Staff, with the DOD, or in combatant commands. While the remaining strategic leaders are assigned to organizations that are nominally single service (Forces Command, Training and Doctrine Command, Army Materiel Command), they frequently work outside Army channels. In addition, many DA civilian strategic leaders hold positions that require a joint perspective.

7-88. The complexity of the work created by joint and multinational requirements is twofold. First, communication is more complicated because of the different interests, cultures, and languages of the participants. Even the cultures and jargon of the various US armed services differ dramatically. Second, subordinates may not be subordinate in the same sense as they are in a purely Army organization. Strategic leaders and their forces may fall under international operational control but retain their allegiances and lines of authority to their own national commanders. UN and NATO commands, such as the IFOR, discussed earlier are examples of this kind of arrangement.

7-89. To operate effectively in a joint or multinational environment, strategic leaders exercise a heightened multiservice and international sensitivity developed over their years of

experience. A joint perspective results from shared experiences and interactions with leaders of other services, complemented by the leader's habitual introspection. Similar elements in the international arena inform an international perspective. Combining those perspectives with their own Army and national perspectives, strategic leaders—

- Influence the opinions of those outside the Army and help them understand Army needs.
- Interpret the outside environment for people on the inside, especially in the formulation of plans and policies.

Most Army leaders will have several opportunities to serve abroad, sometimes with forces of other nations. Perceptive leaders turn such service into opportunities for self-development and personal broadening.

7-90. Chapter 2 describes building a "third culture," that is, a hybrid culture that bridges the gap between partners in multinational operations. Strategic leaders take the time to learn about their partners' cultures—including political, social and economic aspects—so that they understand how and why the partners think and act as they do. Strategic leaders are also aware that the successful conduct of multinational operations requires a particular sensitivity to the effect that deploying US forces may have on the laws, traditions, and customs of a third country.

7-91. Strategic leaders understand American and Army culture. This allows them to see their own culturally-based actions from the viewpoint of another culture—civilian, military, or foreign. Effective testimony before Congress requires an understanding of how Congress works and how its members think. The same is true concerning dealings with other federal and state agencies, non-governmental organizations, local political leaders, the media, and other people who shape public opinion and national attitudes toward the military. Awareness of the audience helps strategic leaders represent their organizations to outside agencies. Understanding societal values—those values people bring into the Army—helps strategic

leaders motivate subordinates to live Army values.

7-92. When the Army's immediate needs conflict with the objectives of other agencies, strategic leaders work to reconcile the differences. Reconciliation begins with a clear understanding of the other agency's position. Understanding the other side's position is the first step in identifying shared interests, which may permit a new outcome better for both parties. There will be times when strategic leaders decide to stick to their course; there will be other times when Army leaders bend to accommodate other organizations. Continued disagreement can impair the Army's ability to serve the nation; therefore, strategic leaders must work to devise Army courses of action that reflect national policy objectives and take into account the interests of other organizations and agencies.

7-93. Joint and multinational task force commanders may be strategic leaders. In certain operations they will work for a CINC but receive guidance directly from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the State Department, or the UN. Besides establishing professional relationships within the DOD and US government, such strategic leaders must build personal rapport with officials from other countries and military establishments.

Military Actions Across the Spectrum

7-94. Since the character of the next war has not been clearly defined for them, today's strategic leaders rely on hints in the international environment to provide information on what sort of force to prepare. Questions they consider include these: Where is the next threat? Will we have allies or contend alone? What will our national and military goals be? What will the exit strategy be? Strategic leaders address the technological, leadership, and moral considerations associated with fighting on an asymmetrical battlefield. They're at the center of the tension between traditional warfare and the newer kinds of multiparty conflict emerging outside the

industrialized world. Recent actions like those in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Grenada, and the Persian Gulf suggest the range of possible military contingencies. Strategic leaders struggle with the ramifications of switching repeatedly among the different types of military actions required under a strategy of engagement.

7-95. The variety of potential missions calls for the ability to quickly build temporary organizations able to perform specific tasks. As they design future joint organizations, strategic leaders must also determine how to engineer both cohesion and proficiency in modular units that are constantly forming and reforming.

STRATEGIC ASSESSING

7-96. There are many elements of their environment that strategic leaders must assess. Like leaders at other levels, they must first assess themselves: their leadership style, strengths and weaknesses, and their fields of excellence. They must also understand the present operational environment—to include the will of the American people, expressed in part through law, policy, and their leaders. Finally, strategic leaders must survey the political landscape and the international environment, for these affect the organization and shape the future strategic requirements.

7-97. Strategic leaders also cast a wide net to assess their own organizations. They develop performance indicators to signal how well they're communicating to all levels of their commands and how well established systems and processes are balancing the six imperatives. Assessment starts early in each mission and continues through its end. It may include monitoring such diverse areas as resource use, development of subordinates, efficiency, effects of stress and fatigue, morale, and mission accomplishment. Such assessments generate huge amounts of data; strategic leaders must make clear what they're looking for so their staffs can filter information for them. They must also guard against misuse of assessment data.

World War II Strategic Assessment

Pursuing a “Germany first” strategy in World War II was a deliberate decision based on a strategic and political assessment of the global situation. Military planners, particularly Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, worried that US troops might be dispersed and used piecemeal. Strategic leaders heeded Frederick the Great’s adage, “He who defends everywhere defends nowhere.” The greatest threat to US interests was a total German success in Europe: a defeated Russia and neutralized Great Britain. Still, the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines and the threat to the line of communications with Australia tugged forces toward the opposite hemisphere. Indeed, throughout the first months of 1942, more forces headed for the Pacific Theater than across the Atlantic.

However, before the US was at war with anyone, President Franklin Roosevelt had agreed with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to a “Germany first” strategy. The 1942 invasion of North Africa restored this focus. While the US military buildup took hold and forces flowed into Great Britain for the Normandy invasion in 1944, operations in secondary theaters could and did continue. However, they were resourced only after measuring their impact on the planned cross-channel attack.

IMPROVING ACTIONS



Figure 7-6. Strategic Leader Actions—Improving

7-98. Improving is institutional investment for the long haul, refining the things we do today for a better organization tomorrow. A fundamental goal of strategic leaders is to leave the

Army better than they found it. Improving at this level calls for experimentation and innovation; however, because strategic-level organizations are so complex, quantifying the results of changes may be difficult.

7-99. Improving the institution and organizations involves an ongoing tradeoff between today and tomorrow. Wisdom and a refined frame of reference are tools to understand what improvement is and what change is needed. Knowing when and what to change is a constant challenge: what traditions should remain stable, and which long-standing methods need to evolve? Strategic leaders set the conditions for long-term success of the organization by developing subordinates, leading change, building the culture and teams, and creating a learning environment.

7-100. One technique for the Army as a learning institution is to decentralize the learning and other improving actions to some extent. That technique raises the questions of how to share good ideas across the entire institution and how to incorporate the best ideas into doctrine (thus establishing an Army-wide standard) without discouraging the decentralized learning process that generated the ideas in the

first place. Those and other questions face the strategic leaders of the learning organization the Army seeks to become.

DEVELOPING

George C. Marshall learned leadership from John J. Pershing, and Marshall's followers became great captains themselves: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Omar N. Bradley...among them. Pershing and Marshall each taught their subordinates their profession; and, more importantly, they gave them room to grow.

General Gordon R. Sullivan
Former Army Chief of Staff

Mentoring

7-101. Strategic leaders develop subordinates by sharing the benefit of their perspective and experience. People arriving at the Pentagon know how the Army works in the field, but regardless of what they may have read, they don't really know how the institutional Army works. Strategic leaders act as a kind of sponsor by introducing them to the important players and pointing out the important places and activities. But strategic leaders actually become mentors as they, in effect, underwrite the learning, efforts, projects, and ideas of rising leaders. The moral responsibility associated with mentoring is compelling for all leaders; for strategic leaders, the potential significance is enormous.

7-102. More than a matter of required forms and sessions, mentoring by strategic leaders means giving the right people an intellectual boost so that they make the leap to operations and thinking at the highest levels. Because those being groomed for strategic leadership positions are among the most talented Army leaders, the manner in which leaders and subordinates interact also changes. Strategic leaders aim not only to pass on knowledge but also to grow wisdom in those they mentor.

7-103. Since few formal leader development programs exist beyond the senior service colleges, strategic leaders pay special attention to their subordinates' self-development, showing them what to study, where to focus, whom to watch, and how to proceed. They speak to audiences at service schools about what goes on "at

the top" and spend time sharing their perspectives with those who haven't yet reached the highest levels of Army leadership. Today's subordinates will, after all, become the next generation of strategic leaders. Strategic leaders are continually concerned that the Army institutional culture and the climates in subordinate organizations encourage mentoring by others so that growth opportunities are available from the earliest days of a soldier or DA civilian's careers.

Developing Intellectual Capital

7-104. What strategic leaders do for individuals they personally mentor, they also seek to provide to the force at large. They invest in the future of the force in several ways. Committing money to programs and projects and investing more time and resources in some actions than others are obvious ways strategic leaders choose what's important. They also value people and ideas as investments in the future. The concepts that shape the thinking of strategic leaders become the intellectual currency of the coming era; the soldiers and DA civilians who develop those ideas become trusted assets themselves. Strategic leaders must choose wisely the ideas that bridge the gap between today and tomorrow and skillfully determine how best to resource important ideas and people.

7-105. Strategic leaders make difficult decisions about how much institutional development is enough. They calculate how much time it will take to plant and grow the seeds required for the Army's great leaders and ideas in the future. They balance today's operational requirements with tomorrow's leadership needs to produce programs that develop a core of Army leaders with the required skills and knowledge.

7-106. Programs like training with industry, advanced civil schooling, and foreign area officer education complement the training and education available in Army schools and contribute to shaping the people who will shape the Army's future. Strategic leaders develop the institution using Army resources when they are available and those of other services or the public sector when they are not.

7-107. After Vietnam the Army's leadership thought investing in officer development so important that new courses were instituted to revitalize professional education for the force. The establishment of the Training and Doctrine Command revived Army doctrine as a central intellectual pillar of the entire service. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 provided similar attention and invigoration to professional joint education and joint doctrine.

7-108. Likewise, there has been a huge investment in and payoff from developing the NCO corps. The Army has the world's finest noncommissioned officers, in part because they get the world's best professional development. The strategic decision to resource a robust NCO education system signaled the Army's investment in developing the whole person—not just the technical skills—of its first-line leaders.

7-109. The Army Civilian Training and Education Development System is the Army's program for developing DA civilian leaders. Like the NCO education system, it continues throughout an individual's career. The first course integrates interns into the Army by explaining Army values, culture, customs, and policies. The Leadership Education and Development Course helps prepare leaders for supervisory demands with training in communication, counseling, team building, problem solving, and group development. For organizational managers, the Organizational Leadership for Executives course adds higher-order study on topics such as strategic planning, change management, climate, and culture. DA civilians in the Senior Executive Service have a variety of leadership education options that deal with leadership in both the military and civilian contexts. Together, these programs highlight ways that leadership development of DA civilians parallels that of soldiers.

BUILDING

The higher up the chain of command, the greater is the need for boldness to be supported by a reflective mind, so that boldness does not degenerate into purposeless bursts of blind passion.

Carl von Clausewitz

Building Amid Change

7-110. The Army has no choice but to face change. It's in a nearly constant state of flux, with new people, new missions, new technologies, new equipment, and new information. At the same time, the Army, inspired by strategic leaders, must innovate and create change. The Army's customs, procedures, hierarchical structure, and sheer size make change especially daunting and stressful. Nonetheless, the Army must be flexible enough to produce and respond to change, even as it preserves the core of traditions that tie it to the nation, its heritage and its values.

7-111. Strategic leaders deal with change by being proactive, not reactive. They anticipate change even as they shield their organizations from unimportant and bothersome influences; they use the "change-drivers" of technology, education, doctrine, equipment, and organization to control the direction and pace of change. Many agencies and corporations have "futures" groups charged with thinking about tomorrow; strategic leaders and their advisory teams are the Army's "futures people."

Leading Change

7-112. Strategic leaders lead change by—

- Identifying the force capabilities necessary to accomplish the National Military Strategy.
- Assigning strategic and operational missions, including priorities for allocating resources.
- Preparing plans for using military forces across the spectrum of operations.
- Creating, resourcing, and sustaining organizational systems, including—
 - Force modernization programs.
 - Requisite personnel and equipment.
 - Essential command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems.
- Developing and improving doctrine and the training methods to support it.

- Planning for the second- and third-order effects of change.
- Maintaining an effective leader development program and other human resource initiatives.

Change After Vietnam

The history of the post-Vietnam Army provides an example of how strategic leaders' commitment can shape the environment and harness change to improve the institution while continuing to operate.

The Army began seeking only volunteers in the early 1970s. With the all-volunteer force came a tremendous emphasis on doctrinal, personnel, and training initiatives that took years to mature. The Army tackled problems in drug abuse, racial tensions, and education with ambitious, long-range plans and aggressive leader actions. Strategic leaders overhauled doctrine and created an environment that improved training at all levels; the CTC program provided a uniform, rock-solid foundation of a single, well-understood warfighting doctrine upon which to build a trained and ready Army. Simultaneously, new equipment, weapons, vehicles, and uniforms were introduced. The result was the Army of Desert Storm, which differed greatly from the force of 15 years earlier.

None of these changes happened by chance or through evolution. Change depended on the hard work of direct and organizational leaders who developed systematically in an environment directed, engineered, and led by strategic leaders.

7-113. Strategic leaders must guide their organizations through eight stages if their initiatives for change are to make lasting progress. Skipping a step or moving forward prematurely subverts the process and compromises success. Strategic leaders (1) demonstrate a sense of urgency by showing not only the benefits of but the necessity for change. They (2) form guiding coalitions to work the process all the way from concept through implementation. With those groups they (3) develop a vision of the future and strategy for achieving it. Because change is most effective when members embrace it, strategic leaders (4) communicate the vision throughout the institution or organization, and then (5) empower subordinates at all levels for widespread, parallel efforts. They (6) plan for short-term successes to validate the programs and keep the vision credible and (7) consolidate those wins and produce further change. Finally, the leader (8) preserves the change culturally. The result is an institution that constantly prepares for and even shapes the future environment. Strategic leaders seek to sustain the Army as that kind of institution.

LEARNING

A good soldier, whether he leads a platoon or an army, is expected to look backward as well as forward; but he must think only forward.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur

7-114. The nation expects military professionals as individuals and the Army as an institution to learn from the experience of others and apply that learning to understanding the present and preparing for the future. Such learning requires both individual and institutional commitments. Each military professional must be committed to self-development, part of which is studying military history and other disciplines related to military operations. The Army as an institution must be committed to conducting technical research, monitoring emerging threats, and developing leaders for the next generation. Strategic leaders, by their example and resourcing decisions, sustain the culture and policies that encourage both the individual and the Army to learn.

7-115. Strategic leaders promote learning by emplacing systems for studying the force and the future. Strategic leaders must resource a structure that constantly reflects on how the Army fights and what victory may cost. All that means constantly assessing the culture and deliberately encouraging creativity and learning.

7-116. The notion of the Army as a “learning organization” is epitomized by the AAR concept, which was developed as part of the REALTRAIN project, the first version of engagement simulation. Since then, it has been part of a cultural change, in which realistic “hot washes,” such as following tough engagements at CTCs, are now embedded in all training. Twenty years ago, anything like today’s AARs would have been rare.

7-117. Efficient and effective operations require aligning various initiatives so that different factions are not working at cross-purposes. Strategic leaders focus research and development efforts on achieving combined arms success. They deal with questions such as: Can these new systems from various sources communicate with one another? What happens during digitization lapses—what’s our residual

combat capability? Strategic leaders coordinate time lines and budgets so that compatible systems are fielded together. However, they are also concerned that the force have optimal capability across time; therefore, they prepare plans that integrate new equipment and concepts into the force as they’re developed, rather than waiting for all elements of a system to be ready before fielding it. Finally, learning what the force should be means developing the structure, training, and leaders those future systems will support and studying the variety of threats they may face.

7-118. The Louisiana Maneuvers in 1941 taught the Army what mechanized warfare would look like and what was needed to prepare for it. The study of the same name 50 years later helped produce the conceptual Force XXI and the first digitized division. Strategic leaders commissioned these projects because the Army is dedicated to learning about operations in new environments, against different threats. The projects were strategic counterparts to the rehearsals that direct and organizational leaders conduct to prepare for upcoming missions.

SECTION III

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP— GENERAL OF THE ARMY MARSHALL DURING WORLD WAR II

7-119. GA George C. Marshall was one of the greatest strategic leaders of World War II, of this century, of our nation’s history. His example over many years demonstrates the skills and actions this chapter has identified as the hallmarks of strategic leadership.

7-120. Chosen over 34 officers senior to him, GA Marshall became Army Chief of Staff in 1939, a time of great uncertainty about the future of the free world. Part of his appeal for President Roosevelt was his strength of character and personal integrity. The honesty and candor that GA Marshall displayed early in their relationship were qualities the president knew he and the nation would need in the difficult times ahead.

7-121. The new Army Chief of Staff knew he had to wake the Army from its interwar slumber and grow it beyond its 174,000 soldiers—a size that ranked it seventeenth internationally, behind Bulgaria and Portugal. By 1941 he had begun to move the Army toward his vision of what it needed to become: a world-changing force of 8,795,000 soldiers and airmen. His vision was remarkably accurate: by the end of the war, 89 divisions and over 8,200,000 soldiers in Army uniforms had made history.

7-122. GA Marshall reached deep within the Army for leaders capable of the conceptual leaps necessary to fight the impending war. He demanded leaders ready for the huge tasks ahead, and he accepted no excuses. As he found

colonels, lieutenant colonels, and even majors who seemed ready for the biggest challenge of their lives, he promoted them ahead of those more senior but less capable and made many of them generals. He knew firsthand that such jumps could be productive. As a lieutenant in the Philippines, he had commanded 5,000 soldiers during an exercise. For generals who could not adjust to the sweeping changes in the Army, he made career shifts as well: he retired them. His loyalty to the institution and the nation came before any personal relationships.

7-123. Merely assembling the required number of soldiers would not be enough. The mass Army that was forming required a new structure to manage the forces and resources the nation was mobilizing for the war effort. Realizing this, GA Marshall reorganized the Army into the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces. His foresight organized the Army for the evolving nature of warfare.

7-124. Preparing for combat required more than manning the force. GA Marshall understood that World War I had presented confusing lessons about the future of warfare. His in-theater experience during that war and later reflection distilled a vision of the future. He believed that maneuver of motorized formations spearheaded by tanks and supported logistically by trucks (instead of horse-drawn wagons) would replace the almost siege-like battles of World War I. So while the French trusted the Maginot Line, GA Marshall emphasized the new technologies that would heighten the speed and complexity of the coming conflict.

7-125. Further, GA Marshall championed the common sense training to prepare soldiers to go overseas ready to fight and win. By having new units spend sufficient time on marksmanship, fitness, drill, and fieldcraft, GA Marshall ensured that soldiers and leaders had the requisite competence and confidence to face an experienced enemy.

7-126. Before and during the war, GA Marshall showed a gift for communicating with the American public. He worked closely with the press, frequently confiding in senior newsmen so they would know about the Army's activities

and the progress of the war. They responded to his trust by not printing damaging or premature stories. His relaxed manner and complete command of pertinent facts reassured the press, and through it the nation, that America's youth were entrusted to the right person.

7-127. He was equally successful with Congress. GA Marshall understood that getting what he wanted meant asking, not demanding. His humble and respectful approach with lawmakers won his troops what they needed; arrogant demands would have never worked. Because he never sought anything for himself (his five-star rank was awarded over his objections), his credibility soared.

7-128. However, GA Marshall knew how to shift his approach depending on the audience, the environment, and the situation. He refused to be intimidated by leaders such as Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, or even the president. Though he was always respectful, his integrity demanded that he stand up for his deeply held convictions—and he did, without exception.

7-129. The US role in Europe was to open a major second front to relieve pressure on the Soviet Union and ensure the Allied victory over Germany. GA Marshall had spent years preparing the Army for Operation Overlord, the D-Day invasion that would become the main effort by the Western Allies and the one expected to lead to final victory over Nazi Germany. Many assumed GA Marshall would command it. President Roosevelt might have felt obligated to reward the general's faithful and towering service, but GA Marshall never raised the subject. Ultimately, the president told GA Marshall that it was more important that he lead global resourcing than command a theater of war. GA Eisenhower got the command, while GA Marshall continued to serve on staff.

7-130. GA Marshall didn't request the command that would have placed him alongside immortal combat commanders like Washington, Grant, and Lee. His decision reflects the value of selfless service that kept him laboring for decades without the recognition that came to some of his associates. GA Marshall never attempted to be anywhere but where his country needed

him. And there, finally as Army Chief of Staff, GA Marshall served with unsurpassed vision and brilliance, engineering the greatest victory

in our nation's history and setting an extraordinary example for those who came after him.

SUMMARY

7-131. Just as GA Marshall prepared for the coming war, strategic leaders today ready the Army for the next conflict. They may not have years before the next D-Day; it could be just hours away. Strategic leaders operate between extremes, balancing a constant awareness of the current national and global situation with a steady focus on the Army's long-term mission and goals.

7-132. Since the nature of future military operations is so unclear, the vision of the Army's strategic leaders is especially crucial. Identifying what's important among the concerns of mission, soldiers, weapons, logistics, and technology produces decisions that determine the structure and capability of tomorrow's Army.

7-133. Within the institution, strategic leaders build support for the end state they desire. That means building a staff that can take broad guidance and turn it into initiatives that move the Army forward. To obtain the required support, strategic leaders also seek to achieve consensus beyond the Army, working with Congress and the other services on budget, force structure, and strategy issues and working with other countries and militaries on shared interests. The way strategic leaders communicate direction to soldiers, DA civilians, and citizens determines the understanding and support for the new ideas.

7-134. Like GA Marshall, today's strategic leaders are deciding how to transform today's force into tomorrow's. These leaders have little guidance. Still, they know that they work to develop the next generation of Army leaders, build the organizations of the future, and

resource the systems that will help gain the next success. The way strategic leaders communicate direction to soldiers, DA civilians, and citizens determines the understanding and support for the new ideas. To communicate with these diverse audiences, strategic leaders work through multiple media, adjust the message when necessary, and constantly reinforce Army themes.

7-135. To lead change personally and move the Army establishment toward their concept of the future, strategic leaders transform political and conceptual programs into practical and concrete initiatives. That process increasingly involves leveraging technology and shaping the culture. By knowing themselves, the strategic players, the operational requirements, the geopolitical situation, and the American public, strategic leaders position the force and the nation for success. Because there may be no time for a World War II or Desert Storm sort of buildup, success for Army strategic leaders means being ready to win a variety of conflicts now and remaining ready in the uncertain years ahead.

7-136. Strategic leaders prepare the Army for the future through their leadership. That means **influencing** people—members of the Army, members of other government agencies, and the people of the nation the Army serves—by providing purpose, direction, and motivation. It means **operating** to accomplish today's missions, foreign and domestic. And it means **improving** the institution—making sure its people are trained and that its equipment and organizations are ready for tomorrow's missions, anytime, anywhere.